University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Publications of Center for Public Affairs
Research (UNO)

Public Policy Center, University of Nebraska

1987

The Macroeconomics of Nebraska's Competitiveness World
Agricultural Markets
Frank Zahn
University of Nebraska at Omaha

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cpar
Part of the Public Affairs Commons

Zahn, Frank, "The Macroeconomics of Nebraska's Competitiveness World Agricultural Markets" (1987).
Publications of Center for Public Affairs Research (UNO). 32.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cpar/32

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Public Policy Center, University of Nebraska at
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Publications of Center for
Public Affairs Research (UNO) by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

NEBRASKA POLICY CHOICES 1987, ed. Russell L. Smith
(Omaha: Center for Applied Urban Research, 1987).

The Macroeconomics of
.
Nebraska's Competitiveness In
world Agricultural Markets

--
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Frank Zahn
Nebraska faces a cyclical and a secular decline in its competitiveness in
world agricultural markets. Economic instability and technological advances
account for much of the decline, along with unfair trade practices and
counterproductive government intervention. The short-term forecasts for the
U.S. economy are fairly bright, but the farm economy, particularly in
Nebraska, is gloomy. Because it is unlikely that government price and income
supports will continue at current levels, Nebraska must take some bold steps
to provide a healthier farm sector. Policy choices for state action include
supporting federal policies that promote domestic and international economic
stability, fair international trade, and the elimination of farm income
supplements based on production; funding for research to determine
Nebraska's areas of comparative advantage in farm products; implementing
programs that expedite reallocation of resources to their most productive
uses; and developing a state marketing strategy for each traded product that
improves Nebraska's share in world markets.

Until a little over a decade ago, Nebraska's farmers
thought they were insulated from the forces that shape
the overall or macroeconomy. In the 1970s, it became
clear that they were not insulated, and the connections, at
first, seemed to be all for the good. Large quantities of
Nebraska's farm products were being sold abroad, and
farm incomes soared.
Now, the euphoria has passed and the boom of the
1970s is viewed as a short-lived cyclical upturn, rather
than a sustainable acceleration in the growth of the farm
economy. The upturn was followed by a cyclical
downturn in the 1980s. The cyclical downturn, along with
an underlying long-term or secular decline in the demand
for Nebraska's farm exports, has created serious
problems for farmers. Nebraskans recognized more
clearly than ever before that the state's farm sector,
which is a significant component of the country's farm
sector, is quite sensitive to changes in the overall or
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macroeconomic environment. As a result, the influence f
U.S. macroeconomic policy must be carefully considered
when analyzing the problems facing Nebraska's farmer:
Farming in Nebraska is linked to the U.S. far~
sector, the U.S. macroeconomy, and the world economy
Growth in international trade since World War II and th'
emergence of well-developed international credit market e
means that farming in Nebraska, along with the WhOl s
U.S. economy, is' an integral part of the world economy~
Moreover, now that the value of the U.S. dollar is
allowed to fluctuate in international currency markets
Nebraska's farmers are exposed more than ever to th~
uncertainties of changes in international economic
condi tions.
The current worldwide glut of farm products has a
negative effect on all U.S. farm exports. NebraSka's
economy is influenced more than other states because it
is more dependent on export markets. Part of the glut is
due to the expansion of farm production during the 19708.
Much of the glut, however, is due to long-term or
secular forces, particularly technological advances in
agriculture. Both cyclical and secular factors have
increased dramatically the quantity and quality of
competitors that Nebraska's farmers must face in world
markets.
In this chapter, the macroeconomic forces that allow
Nebraska's farmers to compete in world markets are
discussed, and an assessment of their future prospects is
presented.
First,
the
scope and
meaning of
competitiveness in world markets is discussed. Then, the
principal way by which U.S. macroeconomic policy
influences the competitiveness of farmers on the supply
and demand sides of world agricultural markets is
explained. Next, the role of U.S. macroeconomic policy in
the cyclical instability of the 1970s and 19805 is
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ssessed. The factors that influenced the secular decline
an competitiveness and the outlook for the U.S. economy
Into the 1990s are discussed also. Finally, several
:rnportant guidelines for economic policy and policy
initiatives that can help improve the competitiveness of
~ebraska's farmers in world markets are discussed.
competitiveness in World Markets
Conventional wisdom tells us that a country can
benefit from making the products that it can produce
more cheaply than other countries and trading them for
products that other countries can produce more cheaply.
Stated differently, if each country does what it does
better than other countries and trades for what others do
better, each country gets what it wants at the lowest unit
cost possible. This is the principle of comparative
advantage.
Trade based on the principle of comparative
advantage provides the most output of goods and services
possible for each country, given its scarce supplies of
labor, capital, and other resources. Natural resources,
large domestic markets (which make it possible to
realize economies of scale), human capital resources,
and technological advances (the most important factor)
have aided comparative advantage in the United States.
Although technological advances may provide a
country with comparative advantage for awhile, other
countries soon learn to use the technology and the country
loses its comparative advantage. Classic examples include
Britain's loss of comparative advantage in textile
production to Japan, the United States, and Western
Europe during the 19th century. And, these countries are
now losing comparative advantage to countries in Asia
and Africa where labor is cheaper and more abundant.
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The United States has gained and lost comparativ
advantage in one product after another,
includi e
automobiles, textiles, steel, heavy electrical generati~
equipment, and transistors. Despite losses, the United
States remains in the forefront of world trade. On
reason for this is that the United States continues t~
adapt to changes in world trade conditions. Today, the
United States is gaining in international trade of je
aircraft,
computers,
and other recently develoPed
products. Although comparative advantage, once lost, can
be reclaimed by reducing unit costs, in a dynamic world
countries (as well as states or regions within countries)
may lose comparative advantage permanently.
U.S. farmers probably still have a comparative
advantage in some agricultural products (corn, wheat, and
soybeans). U.S. exports of agricultural products jumped
sixfold from 1970 ($7.3 billion) to 1981 ($43.3 billion)
Nebraska shared in this growth. By 1981, 30 percent o
Nebraska's farm output was exported to other states and
countries. Moreover, Nebraska's significance in total
U.S. farm output expanded relative to other states. In
1981, it ranked fifth among the states in cash sales
(U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1985).
However, since 1981, U.S. farm exports have fallen
sharply, down 25 percent in 1985 from the peak of 1981
and down another 12 percent in 1986. (These estimates
by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (1985) are
preliminary.) Nebraska has been one of the hardest hi
states.
These sharp declines s~ggest a loss o
comparative advantage or that comparative advantage
alone does not explain how much farmers are able to
sell in world markets.
A country has a competitive advantage, or is
competitive, if it can sell its products in world markets.
Comparative advantage, or comparatively lower costs of
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production, is an important factor influencing a country'~
competitive advantage. However, other factors influencE
it as well (Hushak, 1987).
Factors such as market
imperfections
and
rnacroeconomic policy can override cost considerations ir
rnarkets, making it possible for a country to enjo)
competitive advantage in product markets, that is, makin~
it possible to sell the products it produces, regardless oj
comparative advantage. Guided by desires, such as selfsufficiency, preservation of the family (small scale:
farm, and nationalism, countries formulate and implemen
policies in an attempt to improve their competitiVE
advantage, even though they do not have a comparatiVE
advantage.
Some countries provide government subsidies and
price support to keep high-cost producers in business
others restrict imports with tariffs and quotas, while
others attempt to lower the value of their currency t<
make their exports more attractive in world markets. It
these cases, gains in competitive advantage are generall~
short lived. Countries respond by formulating policie:
that minimize the effects of another country's efforts t(
manipulate competitive advantage, or they retaliate agains
these unfair trade practices.
Although comparative advantage remains the ideal
basis for trade, it is only one factor that must b4
considered in a comprehensive analysis of the competitiv4
advantage or competitiveness of farmers. Other factor:
also influence the willingness and ability of farmers tc
produce and sell their products. Cost or supply sid4
considerations determine a farmer's willingness tc
produce and offer farm products for sale,
whil4
spending or demand side considerations determine j
farmer's ability to sell. Both supply side and demanc
side considerations are important in understanding th4
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competitiveness of Nebraska's
agricultural markets.

farmers

in

world

Macroeconomic Policy

u.s.

macroeconomic policy influences the supply and
demand sides of agricultural markets and, thereby, the
competitiveness of all U.S. farmers, including those in
Nebraska (Gardner,
1981).
Two basic types of
macroeconomic policy exist: Monetary policy and fiscal
policy. Monetary policy changes the rate of growth of
money available for spending in the economy. It is
controlled mainly by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System in Washington, DC. Fiscal policy
alters total spending directly by changing the rate of
growth of government spending in the economy or
indirectly by changing the rate of growth of after-tax
income available to consumers and businesses. It is
controlled mainly by the U.S. Congress and the President.
The primary domestic objective of these policies is to
maintain total spending in the economy, which ensures
full employment without adding to inflation.
Even with the best of intentions, macroeconomic
policies are often inappropriate, and spending grows
either too little or too much. When total spending in the
economy grows less than the nation's output of goods and
services, inventories pile up, the inflation rate falls, and
the economy experiences recession. Also, less spending
reduces the demand for credit and nominal interest rates
(those quoted in financial markets) fall. But, when total
spending grows more than the nation's output of goods
and services, the inflation rate rises and the economy
recovers. At close to full employment, if the gap
between the rates of growth of total spending and total
output widens, the economy may experience a rising
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'nflation rate and negligible growth in output of goods
Additional spending also increases the
demand for credit, and nominal interest rates rise.
Because macroeconomic policies influence nominal
interest rates and the inflation rate, they also affect the
difference between them, namely real (inflation-adjusted)
interest rates:

~nd services.

Real Interest Rates

= Nominal Interest Rates - The Inflation Rate

Table 1 shows the influences of U.S. monetary and
fiscal policies on the inflation rate, nominal interest
rates, and real interest rates. To finance an increase in
spending or a decrease in taxes, the federal government
must borrow money in financial markets. This increased
demand for credit places upward pressure on nominal
interest rates. When the federal government spends what
it borrows or when taxpayers spend their additional
after-tax income on goods and services, upward pressure
is placed on the inflation rate. Higher nominal interest
rates raise real interest rates, while a higher inflation
rate reduces real interest rates. The influences tend to
Table 1 - Direction of impact of U.S. macroeconomic
policies on interest rates and inflation
Item

Fiscal policy

Nominal interest rates
Minus
Infla tion rate
Equals
Real interest rates

r
r
r

Monetary policy

1
r
(?)

1
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be offsetting and the net effect is ambiguous. It depend
on which of the two, the interest rate effect or th
inflation rate effect, dominates. Given that the quanti
of money in the economy does not change, it is likely
that the interest rate effect dominates, and expansionary
fiscal policy raises real interest rates. Of course, th
effects of contractionary fiscal policy, that is, les
government spending or increased taxes, produces th
opposite result.
When the Board of Governors of the Federa
Reserve System,
the nation's monetary authority
increases the quantity of money in the economy
downward pressure is placed on nominal interest rates
More of any asset in the economy generally implies tha
the price for its use falls. As the new money is spen
on goods and services, upward pressure is placed on th
inflation rate. Expansionary monetary policy lower
nominal interest rates and raises the inflation rate, an
each of these changes reduces real interest rates. O
course, contractionary monetary policy, which reduces th
nation's money supply, produces the opposite effect.

The Link with Interest Rates

Real interest rates transmit changes in macro
economic policy to the supply and demand sides of th
U.S. agricultural markets (figure 1). Real interest rate
influence the supply of farm products directly b
changing costs of production and the demand for farm
products by changing exchange rates. In turn, the suppl
of and demand for farm products determine farm price
and sales or earned income.
A flexible exchange rate system allows changes i
real interest rates to affect the demand for farm
products (Hakkio, 1986). When real interest rates in th
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Figure 1
/Ul Interest Rate Transmission Mechanism for Macroeconomic Policy

Macroeconomic
policies
• Monetary
• Fiscal

.....--.

Nominal
interest rates

.-

minus

Exchange
rates

Inflation rate
equals
Real interest
rates

SUpply of U.S.
farm products

Farm prices
and farm
income

~1-----1

Demand for
U.S. farm

products
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United States change relative to those in other COuntr'
Ies
they affect exchange rates and export demand. p'
example, when real interest rates in the United Stator
increase, U.S. financial assets become relatively moes
profit~ble than those of other countries. People in
countnes then demand more U.S. dollars to buy mor
U.S. financial assets. In turn, the increased demand foe
U.S. dollars raises the value of the dollar relative /
other currendes in international currency marketsO
However, a more expensive dollar reduces forei~
demand for U.S. products, including farm products (U.S.
exports), and increases domestic demand for foreign
products (U.S. imports). Hence, higher real interest
rates lead to a higher exchange value for the U.S. dollar
and U.S. farm products become more expensive or less
competitive in world markets.
Changes in real interest rates affect the supply of
f arm products by changing costs of production. An
increase in interest rates, for example, raises the cost
of credit to finance purchases of new capital; to carry
inventories; to finance purchases of inputs, such as
feeder livestock, seeds, fuel, and fertilizer; and to
service variable-interest debt. Just as higher real
interest rates increase the value of the dollar and make
U.S. farm products less competitive through the demand
side of world markets, they increase production costs
and make farm products more expensive or less
competitive through the supply side of world markets.
Changes in the supply of and demand for U.S. farm
products, brought on by policies that influence real
interest rates, alter U.S. farm prices. Moreover, because
farm prices are more flexible than other prices, they
adjust more quickly to economic change. Consequently,
when monetary and fiscal policies either stimulate or
reduce total spending in the economy, farm prices change

oth:;
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re quickly than other prices at home and abroad
~;rankel, 1984). In free markets, this means that when
f fin prices rise, farmers produce more than they will
a. able to sell in world markets when prices again
b:a.bilize. Conversely, when prices fall, farmers produce
~ sS than they will be able to sell in world markets
:hen prices again stabilize. This overshooting of farm
Idces lends credibility to the argument that formulation
~f U.S. macroeconomic policy should take into account
the disproportionate effects of policy on the farm sector
in the short-term.
Cyclical Rise and Decline in Competitiveness
The markets for farm products were relatively
stable during the 1950s and the 1960s. U.S. government
regulation of credit markets and macroeconomic policy
promoted relatively low and stable real interest rates
which stabilized costs of production on the supply side of
agricultural markets. Moreover, U.S. monetary policy
maintained fixed exchange rates on the U.S. dollar so
that, along with an income-insensitive domestic demand
for farm products, there was stable growth in the
demand for farm products.
Beyond the underlying
stability created by a relatively stable macroeconomic
environment, government price supports ensured that
prices of farm products would not fall to unreasonable
levels in case of unexpected changes in either the demand
or supply sides of agricultural markets.
The stability of the 1950s and early 1960s soon gave
way to the boom and bust years of the 1970s and 1980s.
Clearly, changes in macroeconomic policy during this
period had an important influence on real interest rates,
which seriously impaired the competitiveness of U.S.
in world
producers,
including Nebraska farmers,
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markets. The effect of changes in the mix of monetary
and fiscal policies on variables critical to the
competitiveness of farmers during the 1970s and 1980
s is
summarized in table 2.
Beginning in the mid-1960s, total spending in th
economy grew relative to the nation's output of gOOds an~
services. There was rapid growth in private secto
spending, as well as government spending. More an~
more government spending was directed toward winning
the Vietnam War and solving the country's social
problems. This growth in spending was supported by the
Federal Reserve pumping more money into the economy.
The easy fiscal policy, combined with the easy monetary
policy in the late 1960s and 1970s showed that When the
desire to spend grows relative to the ability to produce
the inflation rate rises.
Table 2 - The direction and impact of U.S. macroeconomic policy on real
interest rates for several time periods
Item

Early 1970s'

Nominal interest rates

(Small)

Minus
Inflation rate

(Large)

Equals
Real interest rates
Exchange rates

4

i
i
1
1

Late 1970s 2
to early 1980s

(Large)

(Large)

i
1

i
i

Since 1985~

1
~4

1
1

'This period was characterized by easy fiscal policies and easy monetary
policies.
2This period was characterized by easy fiscal policies and tight monetary

policies.
3This period was characterized by tighter fiscal policies and easier monetary
policies.
4Foreign currency price of U.S. dollars.
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Other factors also helped to increase prices of farm
oducts.
In the early 1970s, several short crops
pferseas drove down world stocks of farm products.
~~oreover, income growth in developing (Third World)
. untries increased the demand for food. These factors
~~a.rnaticallY increased U.S. farm export demand, and
rices of farm products soared.
P In the 1970s, nominal interest rates did not adjust
sufficiently to offset the rising inflation rate. As a
result, real interest rates fell (figure 2). With low and
even negative actual real interest rates in the United
Sta.tes, the demand for higher yielding foreign assets
increased.
The shift from U.S. dollars to other
currencies put downward pressure on the exchange value
of the dollar in international currency markets. The
FIGURE 2
Real Prime Interest Rate, United States, 1970-86
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pressure was so substantial that the United Stat
abandoned the fixed exchange rate system and let ~s
dollar float against other currencies. As a result th
value of the dollar declined substantially during the i97Q
(figure 3). This action ushered in the flexible exchang
rate system which evolved in the mid-1970s. The syste~
was expected to permit internal macroeconomic p<>lic
independent of fluctuations in the exchange rate. On thY
downside, however, flexible exchange rates provided th
vehicle whereby U.S. producers, including farmers, Were
exposed to the uncertainties of changes in world marke
conditions.
As the value of the dollar fell during the 1970s, the
purchasing power of foreign currencies rose and othe
countries demanded more U.S.
products,
including
Nebraska farm products. Abundant credit, available a
FIGURE 3
Federal Reserve Trade Weighted Exchange Rate
for the U.S. Dollar, 1970-86
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1 w real interest rates, promoted growth in exports

to
~hird World countries as well. The increase in farm
xport demand resulted in upward pressure on farm
e~ices, and farmers responded with substantial increases
Pn farm production. In fact, prices of farm products
Increased relatively more than prices of other products
I
.
during most of the 1970s, that 1S, the terms of trade
between farmers and other domestic producers in the
I economy changed in favor of the farmer (figure 4). The
increased demand for farm products and the general
i )Ucrease
in demand for real assets, which serve as
hedges against inflation, increased the demand for farm
assets, particularly farmland. Rising farm equity served
as collateral for additional credit, which farmers used to
finance capital investment and increase production.
FIGURE 4

U.s. Farm and Non-Farm Prices, 1970-86
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The increased demand for farm products in til
early 1970s brought prosperity to the agricultural secto e
but prosperity soon gave way to despair for rn~'
farmers in the 1980s. Although the trend of nominal n~
farm income, including government payments, has been
relatively flat since the late 1970s (figure 5), its
dramatic increase between 1970 and 1973 set off a
period of farmland speculation. Rising land prices during
the 1970s and rising interest rates during the late 1970s
and early 1980s meant that farmers needed more cash to
meet their financial obligations. The growth in farm
debt, particularly debt on farmland, and the failure of
net cash income to grow as it had during the early 1970s
strained the ability of some farmers to service their
debt and continue operating.
FIGURE 5
Nominal and Real U.S. Net Farm Income, 1970-86
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The prosperity of the 1960s and the early 1970s in
the United States was the result of easy fiscal and
monetary policies. Substantial growth in total spending
relative to total production resulted in double digit
inflation. The Unit~d States was on a spending spree.
"Spend to Prospenty" was one of the slogans of the
times.
Although easy fiscal policy continued into the late
1970s, the Federal Reserve initiated a major change in
monetary policy to curb inflation. The Federal Reserve
brought growth in spending in line with growth in the
economy's output by reducing growth in the money supply.
As a result, in the early 1980s the inflation rate fell and
real interest rates rose (figure 2). In turn, higher real
interest rates increased the value of the U.S. dollar
(figure 3).
The more expensive U.S. dollar reduced export
demand. In addition, rising interest rates increased the
debt service payments of Third World countries, the
principal growth markets for farm exports. Therefore,
export demand declined further. The decline in export
demand reduced farm prices, and, once again, farm
prices in the 1980s were more responsive than other
prices to changes in macroeconomic policy, this time on
the downside, that is, the terms of trade turned against
the farmer (figure 4).
Farmers lost more than other domestic producers as
a result of the correction for inflation. In free markets,
prices and quantities supplied would have decreased
enough to balance supplies and demands for farm
products. However, government price supports prevented
. much of the adjustment in the 1980s. The result has been
overproduction of farm products.
Because of the decline in inflation during the early
1980s, the Federal Reserve has eased monetary policy

I
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since 1985. Monetary ease and tighter fiscal pOlicy
influenced by the spirit, if not the letter, of the Gramm'
Rudman, Hollings Bill, have reduced real interest rate~
(figure 2) and the value of the dollar (figure 3).
The drop in the value of the dollar, measured by the
Federal Reserve's general trade weighted index, has
increased U.S.
export demand. However, a rapid
expansion in the export demand for farm products is not
expected. A long lag is a contributing factor, but more
importantly, currencies of major U.S. competitors in
world agricultural markets (for example,
Canada
Argentina, and Australia) have depreciated further agains~
the dollar, making these countries more competitive in
world markets. In addition, Third World countries, the
segment of the world food market with the most
potential for growth, remain bogged down with debt
repayment problems. So, these countries will not be able
to substantially increase purchases of U.S. farm products
in the near future. Moreover, long-term or secular
forces (discussed in the next section) are working to
reduce the growth in U.S. export demand for farm
products.
On the supply side of agricultural markets, U.S.
farm output continues to increase as farmers continue to
respond to government program incentives rather than
market signals. Farmers receive government support
payment based on their production. The more you
produce, the more you get. As a result, overproduction
persists.
Ample farm stocks have led to declining farm prices
(figure 4) and decreases in net farm income (excluding
government payments) in both nominal and real terms.
Government payments have continued,
however, to
maintain the trend in nominal net farm income (including
government payments) since the late 1970s (figure 5).

~13Croeconomics
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Government payments to farmers accounted for 42
ercent of total U.S. net income during 1986. Payments
Po Nebraska's farmers accounted for about 56 percent of
~ebraska's net farm income (U.S. Department of
:Agriculture, 1985).
Secular Decline in Competitiveness
Growth in productivity implies lower costs of
production,
which permits gains in competitiveness
through gains in comparative advantage. Growth in U.S.
agricultural productivity during the 19th century was
based on bringing fertile land into production and
favorable climatic conditions. These factors are still
important, but they account for only part of the
spectacular growth in agricultural productivity. While
farm output has tripled, labor requirements have fallen
by 80 percent and land area in production has changed
very little
(Nebraska
Department
of
Economic
Development, 1987). The principal sources of growth in
productivity have been technological advances, education,
and capital investment. Biotechnology may ultimately add
more to farming productivity than any other development.
It has the potential for increasing productivity at rates
that are higher than those of the past two centuries
(Avery, 1985).
Recently, however, several factors have contributed
to a secular or long-term decline in the U.S. farmer's
competitiveness in world markets. The most important
factor is the worldwide increase in productivity.
Shortages of cropland, water erosion, and high oil prices
are no longer insurmountable obstacles to countries
seeking to develop their farm sectors. The worldwide
adoption of technological advances, education, and capital
lilYestment increased farm output by 25 percent between
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1972 and 1982. In Third World countries, farm outp t
rose 33 percent, compared with 18 percent in develop~
countries where farm surpluses persist (Hushak, 1987)
U.S. farmers now face stiff competition from forei~
producers who have made gains in competitive advantag
through lower costs of production.
e
Government subsidies of foreign farm sectors have
diminished the U.S. farmer's competitiveness also. For
years the United States exported far more than it
imported. In the 1970s, the U.S. farm sector was the
principal contributor to the U.S. trade surplus. Although
about 30 percent of the country's farm output is still
sold abroad, the United States had an agricultural trade
deficit last year for several months. Foreign producers ,
particularly countries of the European Economic
Community (especially Great Britian and France) gained
competitive advantage with farm export subsidies. These
subsidies permitted them to become net exporters rather
than net importers of grain. This policy reduces the
competitiveness of U.S. farmers in world markets and
has spawned protectionist trade sentiments in the United
States.
Another factor that diminishes the ability of farmers
to sell their products is the decline in population growth.
Despite the fact that Third World countries, comprising
7S percent of the world's population, have yet to enter
the high-demand phase for farm products, the decline in
the rates of population growth in the United States and
worldwide has reduced the potential growth in demand
for
food
(Nebraska
Department
of
Economic
Development, 1987). Both of these rates peaked in the
1960s. Moreover, as incomes increase worldwide, the
percentage of income spent on food declines and reduces
the growth in demand for farm products.
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Still another factor that diminishes the competi-veness of U.S. farmers is the drive for selftlufficiency.
Distrust drives importing countries to
~ecome self-sufficient, particularly in food production.
And, recent actions by the United States have encouraged
countries to become self-sufficient, regardless of the
comparative advantage. As explained earlier, macroeconomic policy induced instability in the U.S economy
during the late 1970s and early 1980s inflated the value
of the dollar. The increase was so dramatic that it
signaled foreign buyers that U.S. farm products may not
always be available at reasonable prices. Rather than be
vulnerable to changes in the economic policies of the
United States and other exporting countries, importing
countries have been encouraged to become self-sufficient
in agriculture.
Further, the United States has shown that it will not
sell food to countries with whom it disagrees politically.
The most recent example is the embargo on grain sales
to Russia in 1980. The messages conveyed by this action
were that the United States is an unreliable supplier and
that political and economic freedom require selfsufficiency.
Finally, protectionist trade policies inhibit growth in
farm export demand. When foreigners initiate such
policies, U.S. farm products become relatively more
expensive, and when the United States initiates such
policies, foreigners tend to retaliate with protectionist
policies of their own. Protectionism prevents gains in
trade and further encourages self-sufficiency.
Because of increased productivity and little growth in
world demand, market prices of U.S. farm products may
fall so much that many farmers will not be able to
continue farming.
In fact,
this has happened.
Overproduction of farm products in the United States,
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created by government price supports set above mark
prices, will persist under current U.S. farm policy. ;t
these supports are reduced, farmers with higher u ,s
costs will have to reduce these costs or go out :
business.
In the 1920s, there were 130,000 farms and ranche
in Nebraska. Through consolidation, induced by increase~
productivity, the number is presently 58,000 (U.S
Department of Agriculture, 1985). Genetic engineeri~
and other scientific advantages will continue to increase
farm output, and thereby reduce the resources needed to
produce farm output. By the year 2000, half of
Nebraska's current productive capacity is expected to be
superfluous
(Nebraska
Department
of
Economic
Development, 1987).

Current Outlook for the Macroeconomic Environment
Nebraska's farm sector is strongly influenced by
changes in its macroeconomic environment. U.S. macroeconomic policy changes that environment. Therefore, the
current stance and direction of U.S. policy is important
in addressing Nebraska's farm problems.
The current objective of U.S. macroeconomic policy
is expected to continue. Monetary and fiscal policy will
be coordinated to promote economic growth while
maintaining macroeconomic stability. That is, policy will
be used to promote secular or long-term growth while
minimizing cyclical activity around the long-term grow~
path of the economy.
U.S.
monetary policy will be used to provide
sufficient spending power to accommodate gains ir
productivity on the supply side of the economy. Monetan
restraint will be used to hold down inflation and stabiliZi.
nominal interest rates. In the spirit of the Gramm'
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Rudman-Hollings Bill, fiscal policy will be geared
toward reduction of the federal budget deficit, and
thereby, help to hold down nominal interest rates.
Farm policy is moving slowly in the direction of
reducing price supports of farm products and letting
rnarkets again provide accurate signals about what to
produce, who should produce it, and how much to
produce. Considerable discussion continues in an effort to
change the basis for current farm support payments.
Basing support on the amount produced encourages
overproduction, which is a principal part of the current
: farm problem.
Although the United States continues to flirt with
protectionism, international trade policy is likely to
,continue to promote free trade, that is, trade based on
the comparative advantage criterion. Japan's reluctance to
open its markets to U.S. products and the European
Economic Community's dumping of government subsidized
farm products are major targets of U.S. trade policy.
Also, efforts will continue to get other countries to
stimulate their growth so they can buy more U.S.
exports. In addition, U.S. trade policy will continue to be
5eared toward international cooperation to stabilize
exchange rates. Thus, they will reflect changes in
relative growth of productivity (or comparative costs)
Jetween countries and not the relative abilities of
:ountries to manipulate exchange rates to their
,ompetitive advantage through unfair practices. Hopefully,
:he 1970s and 1980s have taught us that exchange rate
stability is important in developing and maintaining
sustained growth in export markets.
Based on current macroeconomic policy, the shortrm outlook for U.S. agriculture is healthier than it has
,Jeen for some time. Stability is the principal policy
lbjective, with emphasis on short-term stability (to
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minimize the severity ~f cyclical swings) and. sustainable
secular growth.
GIven the current dIrection f
macroeconomic policy, government and private forecas~
predict that the United States will experience modest, bu~
steady and sustained, growth in output into the 1990s
The Congressional Budget Office expects real gros'
national product (GNP) to grow between 2.5 and 3.~
percent per year through 1992 (Congressional BUdget
Office, 1987). The major source of economic growth
other than increases in private sector consumption, i~
expected to be an increase in net exports (exports less
imports). Exports are expected to rise and imports fall.
Although unemployment is expected to fall from 7 percent
in 1986, to about 6 percent by 1992, real interest rates
are expected to fall as nominal rates decline slightly
(long-term rates more than short-term rates). The
inflation rate is expected to increase from 1.9 percent in
1986, to about 4.3 percent by 1992, and lower real
interest rates are expected to reduce further (although
not dramatically) the value of the U.S. dollar.
Lower real interest rates will improve supply and
demand conditions in agricultural markets for U.S.
farmers. But, the overall outlook for U.S farmers,
particularly those in Nebraska, is not very bright.
Federal government support at current levels is unlikely
and, at best, unreliable. Although the debt problem is
being solved through repayment,
restructuring, and
bank ruptcy, as stated earlier, Nebraska will probably
have to reduce resources in agriculture because of
worldwide overproduction.

Policy Choices
Nebraska farmers, like others associated with U.S.
agriculture, react mostly to changes in domestic and
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'nternational markets. They cannot control these changes,
~ut they can attempt to influence policy initiatives by the
federal government. Recent events and the current
economic outlook suggest several choices for Nebraska's
support of federal government policy.

State Support for Federal Policies
First, Nebraska can support policies that promote
fair trade. When trade is fair, competitiveness is
determined solely on the basis of comparative advantage.
The lower Nebraska's farmers can get their costs
through increased productivity, the more competitive they
will become. Unfair trade occurs when U.S. or foreign
farmers gain a competitive advantage in world markets
through means other than decreases in comparative costs
(for example, government subsidies, price supports, or
favorable macroeconomic policies). These factors distort
exchange rates and obscure relative costs of production
and exchange between trading partners.
Lowering
production costs and adopting international trade policies
that are designed to neutralize, if not eliminate, unfair
trade
practices
are
necessary
for
sustaining
competitiveness in world markets.
Second,
Nebraska can support macroeconomic
policies that promote and maintain a stable domestic and
international environment for production and exchange.
Stability reduces the uncertainty associated with various
types of production, such as agriculture, in which there
are substantial lags between beginning and finishing
production and exchange. The boom and bust years of the
1970s and 1980s are a classic example of macroeconomic
POlicy-induced instability. First low, then high, and then
low real interest rates and exchange rates contributed to
the serious problems of farmers with debt and
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overproduction.
Policy designed to reduce CYClical
instability provides a more certain and less costly
environment for farm management.
Third, Nebraska can support efforts of the Federal
Reserve Board and the federal government to promote
international cooperation for maintaining a stable
international environment. Along with exchange rate
stability, it is important for U.S. trading partners to
stimulate their economies so that they can buy more U.S.
farm products. Recently, the United States made some
progress in this area. Trading partners have pledged to
stimulate their economies if the United States will hold
down real interest rates by reducing the federal deficit.
Another issue of concern is the Third World's debt
problem. Unfortunately, another casualty of the 1970s and
1980s cycle was the Third World market for U.S. farm
products. These countries borrowed heavily to expand
their economies and now they use many of their U.S.
dollars to service debts rather than to buy U.S. products.
Further
debt
restructuring
through
international
cooperation could substantially improve export demand for
U.S. farm products.
Fourth, farm policy must be restructured. Nebraska
can support Congress in efforts to phase out farm price
price
supports
reduce the
supports.
Current
competitiveness of U.S. farmers in world markets and
encourage overproduction. The heart of the problem with
overproduction is that price supports keep relatively
high-cost farmers in business. This means that high-cost
farmers gain at the expense of their lower cost
competitors. Of course,
it is the taxpayers and
consumers who pay for all this. Government payments
may be warranted while phasing out expensive and
counterproductive price supports. But, the humanitarian
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pOlicy of providing government support for farmers need
not encourage overproduction.
In addition to supporting the federal government
pOlicies suggested above, Nebraska can take some direct
stepS to improve its ability to compete.

State Policies to Support Agricultural Competitiveness
First, Nebraska can support and conduct research to
evaluate its areas of actual and potential comparative
advantage. No adequate study has been conducted to
determine the products for which the United States has a
comparative advantage.
No such study has been
undertaken at the state level either. In a world which is
becoming increasingly global and market sensitive, more
research is essential.
Second, Nebraska can adapt more quickly to larger
scale farm production. Increased productivity (which
decreases unit costs) through large-scale production is a
worldwide reality and no amount of state legislation,
such as Nebraska's Initiative 300, is going to help smallscale farmers survive in world markets. Initiative 300
continues to inhibit Nebraska's efforts to regain its
competitive edge in world agricultural markets.
Third, identifying the products in which Nebraska's
farmers enjoy a comparative advantage and moving to
large-scale production is unlikely to justify retaining
current resources in farm production. As mentioned
earlier, it is expected that Nebraska will have to reduce
the amount of land in agriculture by about half during
this century. This is expected to help Nebraska catch up
with the deagriculturalization of its economy. This
process has been occurring nationally, and to a lesser
extent in the state, for the past 100 years. Of course,
deagriculturalization must be accompanied by efforts to
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develop new sources of income.
Futhermore, th
adjustment from farm to nonfarm employment Wil~
require additional policy initiatives at the state level.
Fourth, Nebraska can initiate measures at the state
level (and cooperate at the national level) and thus
provide a better marketing strategy for its farm
products in world markets. Efforts must be made at the
commodity level with buyers in specific countries where
it is likely that state officials would be more effective
negotiators. Clearly, in an increasingly competitive world
the ability of Nebraska's farmers to recapture and
expand domestic and international markets will depend on
how aggressively the markets are pursued. In order to
survive,
Nebraska's farmers must become more
entrepreneurial in the production and marketing of their
products.
Conclusions
Nebraska's farm problem is both cyclical and
secular. The macroeconomic policy of the 1970s and
1980s caused a cyclical decline in the competitiveness of
farmers in world agricultural markets. Since the early
1980s, the United States has pursued a general policy of
restoring macroeconomic stability. Recovery from the
cyclical downturn in agriculture is not expected to
restore sales of farm products to their peak levels of
the 1970s and 1980s. Clearly, preoccupation with cyclical
activity has obscured the underlying secular problem of
the farm sector.
Substantial increases in productivity, due primarily to
technological advances and modest growth in demand,
mean lower farm prices and the withdrawal of
resources from production. However, government price
supports and other forms of protectionism have resulted
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in the overproduction of farm products. In the absence of
trade based on comparative advantage, the world has no
waY of determining how much food to produce and who
should produce it so that resources are not wasted.
Government price supports obscure accurate market
information about possible gains in trade for farmers,
and taxpayers are often forced to buy with their tax
dollars what they refused to buy as consumers. This
state of affairs makes no economic sense. The policy
choices presented above may contribute to providing a
more rational approach to addressing the problems of
agriculture.
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